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Abstract
We use data on announced and actual exchange rate arrange-
ments to ask which countries follow de facto regimes diﬀerent
from their de iure ones, that is, do not do what they say. Our
results suggest that countries with poor institutional quality have
diﬃculty in maintaining pegging and abandon it more often. In
contrast, countries with relatively good institutions display fear
of ﬂoating, i.e. they manage more than announced, perhaps to
signal their diﬀerences from those countries incapable of main-
taining promises of monetary stability.
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Why do certain countries announce an exchange rate regime (say ﬂoat-
ing) and then deviate from it (say they peg)? What prevents countries
from delivering what they promised, a situation which is rather common
especially in non-OECD countries?
There are two aspects of this question. One, which is more well
known, is why countries do not hold announced pegs and devalue. Re-
cently, a diﬀerent type of deviation from announcements has been quite
common: Calvo and Reinhart (2002) show that while many countries
claim to be ﬂoating, in fact they peg, experiencing what has been la-
beled “fear of ﬂoating.” Our goal is to identify what institutional char-
acteristics of countries make them “fearful” of following through with
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of exchange rate regimes and to Federico Sturzenegger as well as Jay Shambaugh for
giving us an easy access to their own data. Fritz Schneider and participants of the
“macrolunch” at Harvard gave us many useful comments. Priyanka Malhotra was
an excellent research assistant. Alesina is grateful to the NSF for a grant through
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1actions what they announce in words, thus reneging on announcements
of exchange rate regimes. We show below that diﬀerent forces that lead
to announce a peg and then ﬂoat and viceversa.
We begin, ﬁrst, by analyzing the choice of exchange rate regimes, that
is why certain countries choose to ﬂoat or to peg, building upon a small
recent literature which discusses empirically why countries adopt cer-
tain arrangements or others. Recent contributions in this area include
Frieden et al. (2000), Levy-Yeyati, Sturzenegger and Reggio (2002),
Obstfeld and Taylor (2002) amongst others.1 Explaining the choice of
exchange rate regimes is diﬃcult from the start, since a classiﬁcation of
regimes is problematic. The IMF has traditionally oﬀered a classiﬁcation
which is “de iure,” that is, it is essentially based on what the countries
say that they do. As a result, for example in certain periods certain
countries are classiﬁed as ﬂoating even though their exchange rate never
moves vis-a-vis, say, the US dollar. Several attempts have been made
to adjust this classiﬁcation or to oﬀer altogether new ones. Some stud-
ies adjust the IMF classiﬁcation;2 Recently, Reinhart and Rogoﬀ (2003)
have taken a more radical approach: they classify regimes based upon
a statistical analysis of the observed behavior of exchange rates, and
consider explicitly the fact that many countries - even in the developed
world - have or had dual exchange rate markets. We use the diﬀerence
between the de iure classiﬁcation of the IMF and the de facto classi-
ﬁcation of RR as an indicator of the discrepancy between announced
behavior and actual behavior.
Our results can be summarized as follows. First, the major determi-
nant of choosing to ﬁx is the level of foreign denominated labilities. More
liabilities lead countries to prefer ﬁxing. Second, countries (and periods)
with relatively poor political institutions (more corruption, less protec-
tion of property rights etc.) are less able to stick to their announcements
of ﬁxing; they end up ﬂoating more than what they announce and often
break commitments to pegging. Probably this reﬂects an inability of
”poor quality” governments to maintain macroeconomic stability which
is a precondition for holding pegs. Third, countries that display fear
of ﬂoating (i.e. that announce ﬂoating but then have a ﬁxed exchange
rate) tend to have relatively good institutions. We interpret this result
as reﬂecting a signalling device at work: since reneging on a commitment
1A much larger literature studies the eﬀects of diﬀerent exchange rate regimes
on the economy and, in fact, an immense literature debates the pros and cons of
alternative arrangements. See Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (1999) for an overview.
2See Ghosh et al. (1997), Frieden et al. (2000)). Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger
(2003) have oﬀered a classiﬁcation based on data on exchange rates and international
reserves. Shambaugh (2003) oﬀers another classiﬁcation based on statistical analysis
of the exchange rate itself.
2of ﬁxing is associated with poor quality of institutions and of policies,
more ”virtuous” countries tend to avoid ﬂoating to raise their credibility
and instead try to signal “rigor” .
Our paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews some theoretical
considerations that form the basis of our empirical investigation. Section
3 describes the data sets that we use and in particular it describes the cri-
teria used for diﬀerent classiﬁcations. It also provides some discussions of
basic correlations. Section 4 present our results on the politico-economic
determinants of the choice of exchange rate regimes. Sections 5 and 6
discuss the determinants of deviations from announced exchange rate
arrangements. The last section concludes.
2 Our hypotheses
Let us brieﬂy review some key theoretical issues relevant for our em-
pirical investigation. The ”classic” view is that exchange rate regime
choice should be determined by optimal currency area considerations,
as in the celebrated work by Mundell (1961). The extent of mobility
of factors and the ﬂexibility of relative price adjustments were critical
determinants of the optimality of a currency area. Later on, ﬁxing the
exchange rate was viewed as a device to create a precommittment to
monetary stability, threatened by time inconsistency problems, as in
Barro and Gordon (1983). For instance Giavazzi and Giovannini (1989)
argue that certain governments could gain anti-inﬂationary credibility
by ﬁxing their exchange rate to a nominal anchor and argued that this
was one of the original motivations for weak currencies in Europe to peg
t ot h eG e r m a nm a r k .Av a s tl i t a r a t u r et h a tw ec a n n o te v e nb e g i o nt o
revies made similar arguments for Latin American countries and others,
such as Israel in times of high inﬂation.
Alesina and Barro (2002) have examined the question of optimal
currency areas, trade, precommittment and stabilization policies in an
integrated real and monetary model of endogenous formation of areas
of common currency. Countries which trade a lot and have economies
closely integrated with a large partner are likely candidates to peg their
currencies or even to adopt the currency of the partner. Also, and this
is especially relevant for our purposes here, countries with diﬃculties in
making and maintaining a commitment to monetary stability should
view pegging (or monetary unions) as a useful commitment device.
Alesina, Barro and Tenreyro (2003) discuss the empirical implications
of this analysis for the formation of areas of common currencies linked
t oaf e wm a i na n c h o r s . 3An additional important set of issues has to do
3Gale and Vives (2002) discuss related issues of monetary commitment for the
3with the denomination of liabilities of a country. Foreign denominated
liabilities appreciate in local currency if the latter depreciates. This cre-
ates an incentive to hold the value of the domestic currency.4 Cespedes,
Chang and Velasco (2002) (see also many references cited therein) dis-
cuss in detail the relationship between these balance sheets eﬀects and
exchange rate arrangements.5 For a systematic compilation of other ar-
guments put forward as explaining exchange rate regime choice, we refer
the reader to Levy-Yeyati, Sturzenegger and Reggio (2002).
Empirically, we should observe that countries that peg are those who
need an anchor, in particular, for our purposes here, those countries
who do not have domestic institutions capable of guaranteeing macroe-
conomic stability; the countries that break a peg are those that not only
do not have domestic institutions capable of guaranteeing stability, but
also cannot even maintain conditions compatible with pegs. Note that
breaking a peg is less politically and economically costly than reinstating
a country’s own currency after the country has joined a common cur-
r e n c ya r e a s ,s ob r e a k i n gu pp e g si sm u c hm o r ec o m m o nt h a nb r e a k i n g
monetary unions.
Therefore the hypothesis that we test is that the countries more
likely to announce pegs and then break them have poor institutional
quality which is related to poor macroeconomic performance and inabil-
ity to maintain monetary and ﬁscal stability. The link between poor
government quality and poor economic policy has been documented ex-
tensively6.
While theory suggests fairly clear arguments for why certain coun-
tries may abandon pegs, it is less obvious why certain countries an-
nounce ﬂoating arrangements and then peg (fear of ﬂoating). Calvo and
Reinhart (2002) explain it through the eﬀect of nominal volatility on
risk premia paid on borrowing.7 Monetary and exchange rate volatility
would aﬀect the credibility of the country not in terms of ﬁrst moments
(average inﬂation) but in the variance of risk premia.
Ad i ﬀerent but not mutually exclusive argument may have to do with
signalling. Devaluations may be perceived by the market as an indicator
of turbulence and monetary fragility for the reasons discussed above.
Thus, even countries that have not promised a peg may be induced
to actually peg (or in the case where there is no dual market at least
case of banking crises.
4See the discussion in Krugman (1999).
5The balance sheet eﬀect generalizes to an open economy the analysis by Bernanke
and Gertler (1989)
6See Persson (2001) for an overview and the volumes by Persson and Tabellini
(2003) and Drazen (2000).
7For related work see also Calvo and Guidotti (1993)
4to manage their exchange rate to a greater extent than announced) to
avoid signaling weakness to the markets by letting the exchange rate
devalue. Thus fear of ﬂoating may be viewed as a signaling device to
create conﬁdence in the country.
This argument raises the following question: If a “good” country
wants to signal ability to keep a stable rate, than why announce a ﬂoat
and then peg rather than simply announce a peg and stick to it? One
answer is that announcing a ﬂoat allows some room to maneuver. For
instance, in relatively “calm” periods with no exchange rate crises the
fear of ﬂoating may be not to high so this hypothetical country may
use a bit of the ﬂexibility allowed by ﬂoating. On the other hand in
turbulent periods it may be especially important to “signal” and keep
t h ee x c h a n g er a t ec o n s t a n t ,t h a ti st h ef e a ro fﬂoating is especially high.
If this is true we should then ﬁnd that countries with ”poor” insti-
tutions should ﬁnd it diﬃcult to hold on to pegs, while countries with
”good” institutions should experience fear of ﬂoating. We now turn to
the data to test these hypotheses.
3T h e d a t a
Our data consist of three parts: exchange rate classiﬁcations (for 1974
to 2000) are our dependent variable. Institutional quality indices form
our explanatory variables of central interest. To capture the economic
eﬀects discussed above, we also employ a set of control variables. Table
1 in the appendix contains descriptive statistics for all these variables.
3 . 1 E x c h a n g er a t er e g i m e sc l a s s i ﬁcations
De jure versus de facto classiﬁcations. The “traditional” classi-
ﬁcation of exchange rate regimes is provided by the IMF. The oﬃcial
classiﬁc a t i o ni sg i v e ni nt h eI M F ’ sA n n u a lR e p o r to nE x c h a n g eR a t e
Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions, which, until recently, asked
member states to self-declare their arrangement as belonging to one of
four categories. So, for instance if a country says that in year x it is
adopting a ﬂoating regime the IMF classiﬁes this country year as ﬂoat-
ing even if in practice the country pegs its currency tightly to, say, the
US dollar.
Deviations of actual behavior from announcements are rather com-
mon. In fact the empirical work on the eﬀects (and the more limited
amount of work on the determinants) of exchange rate regimes was frus-
trated by these signiﬁcant deviations from actually behavior from an-
nounced behavior. Early studies had extended the four-way oﬃcial clas-
siﬁcation into a more informative taxonomy (see Gosh et. al. (1997)).
In recent years a number of scholars have used statistical methods to
5regroup country practices and provide “de facto”c l a s s i ﬁcations of ex-
change rate arrangement: one such “natural classiﬁcation” is provided
by Reinhart and Rogoﬀ (2003) (RR) and a diﬀerent de facto classiﬁca-
tion is given by Levi-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2003) (LYS). The two
classiﬁcations have in common the fact that they look at what coun-
tries actually do rather than what they say they do. Both classiﬁcations
have their own merits, but for our purpose the RR classiﬁcation is more
appropriate. The main reason for this is that the key diﬀerence be-
tween RR and LYS is that RR look at actual exchange rates, while LYS
base their algorithm on the oﬃcial exchange rates. RR ﬁnd that dual,
or multiple rates, and parallel markets have prevailed quite frequently.
While in the industrial countries, dual rates typically disappeared after
the 1940s and 1950s, in the developing world, such practices remained
commonplace through the 1980s and 1990s and into the present. Since
we are more interested in what the real exchange rate development of
a country is (as opposed to what countries do to inﬂuence the oﬃcial
exchange rate), it is more natural for us to use the RR classiﬁcation is
the benchmark.
There are other reasons why we believe that the RR classiﬁcation
is more appropriate for our purposes8. (The LYS classiﬁcation may be
superior for other purposes, so we do not mean to pick a winner here!).
The algorithm used by LYS also uses (besides the exchange rate) reserves
and base money. As Calvo and Reinhart (2003) note, using reserves has
considerable limitations. Most importantly, the use of reserves in the
LYS classiﬁcation gives rise to many cases of what they refer to as “one
classiﬁcation variable not available.”9 In any case, our ﬁndings reported
in the robustness section indicate that the basic results of our paper
- the role of the quality of institutions for fear of ﬂoating and fear of
p e g g i n g-r e m a i nt h es a m ew h e nw ei n s t e a du s et h eL Y Sc l a s s i ﬁcation
as our measure of the actual exchange rate regime.
We therefore proceed by using the RR classiﬁcation in our main
analysis. Their basic procedure is as follows: Starting from detailed
country chronologies, they ﬁrst ask whether there existed a uniﬁed rate
or dual/multiple/parallel market rates. In the ﬁrst case, they next check
whether, in the case where there was an oﬃcial announcement, the actual
rate behavior passes a statistical veriﬁcation test. If not, or if there was
no announcement, they statistically classify the regime and give it the
8One aspect which we are exploring as we continue to revise this paper is the issue
of one-time devaluations.
9For example, their algorithm could not provide a classiﬁcation for the United
Kingdom until 1987. Some developing countries could not be classiﬁed for any year
over their 1974-2000 sample.
6label “de facto.” The same happens in the case of multiple rates. If the
announcement is veriﬁed, the regime is labeled as “de iure.”
We employ the LYS classiﬁcation in our robustness tests, and we
also use a third, less well-known classiﬁcation, by Shambaugh (2003).
His classiﬁcation in some respects is intermediate between the other
two, because, on the one hand, it focuses solely on the behavior of the
exchange rate (like the RR classiﬁcation) and on the other hand, it uses
the oﬃcial exchange rate (like LYS). He focuses on whether the exchange
rate stays within a band (see the following table). A country with a one-
time realignment but percentage changes of zero in eleven out of twelve
months is considered as ﬁxed. For space reasons, we refer to his paper
for further details.
In Table 2, we match all the classiﬁcations. We need to use RR’s
“coarse” classiﬁcation in order to be able to compare exchange rate
regimes across diﬀerent classiﬁcations10.R Rp o i n to u tt h a ts e p a r a t i n g
“freely falling” countries with other ﬂoaters is important. This is cor-
rect. However, for the purposes of our main exercise - the investigation
of the relation between political factors and the propensity for countries
to deviate from announcements -, this distinction is not crucial. Except
for the table 2, we therefore aggregate RR’s categories 4 and 5 into one
category 4.
Measures of cheating. Our basic approach to quantifying the extent
of “broken promises” is simple but well-grounded in the comparability
o ft h er e g i m ec l a s s i ﬁcations. We take the diﬀerence between RR (or any
of the other de facto classiﬁcations) and the IMF classiﬁcation. Table 3
shows a cross tabulation of observations in the two classiﬁcations.
10RR also provide a ﬁne classiﬁcation with fourteen categories. Category 1 of the
coarse grid covers: no separate legal tender, pre announced peg or currency board
arrangement, pre announced horizontal band that is narrower than or equal to +/-
2%, and de facto peg. Category 2 covers: pre announced crawling peg, pre announced
crawling band that is narrower than or equal to +/- 2%, de facto crawling peg, de
facto crawling band that is narrower than or equal to +/- 2%, pre announced crawling
band that is wide than or equal to +/- 2%. Category 3 covers: de facto crawling
band that is narrower than or equal to +/- 5%, moving band that is narrower than
or equal to +/- 2% (i.e., allows for both appreciation and depreciation over time),
managed ﬂoating.
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Table 3: The prevalence of deviations from announcements
Announcement (IMF)
Peg Limited Managed Float Inconcl. Total
Actual (RR)
Peg 803 94 80 33 5 1015
<2% 257 81 226 145 2 711
<5% 54 0 110 140 0 304
Float 12 25 9 125 1 172
Free fall 484 37 251 157 2 931
Inconcl. 00 0 1 0 1
Total 1610 237 676 601 10 3134
The message of Table 3 is striking: A large percentage of observations
in the sample period (1974 to 2000) indicates deviations of actual policies
from announced policies. It is noteworthy that there are deviations on
both sides of the diagonals of the table, pointing to the fact that some
8countries peg more than they announce and others ﬂoat more than they
announce.
Before we come to our deﬁnitions of the dependent variables, we
point out that there has been some confusion in terms in the emerging
literature on the relation between de iure and de facto exchange rate
regimes. Calvo and Reinhart (2002), for example, deﬁne fear of ﬂoating
as de iure ﬂoaters who do something to smooth the ﬂuctuations of the
nominal rate. Levy-Yeyati, Sturzenegger and Reggio (2002) deﬁne fear
of pegging as having a de facto peg but claiming another regime. Thus,
they really talk about fear of announcing a peg. In other words, the two
terms, even though they sound similar, take diﬀerent viewpoints. The
two diﬀerent notions can be represented in the following graph:
Figure 1: Fear of ﬂoating (Calvo-Reinhart 2002) and fear of
announcing pegging (Levy-Yeyati, Sturzenegger and Reggio 2002)
Our main interest in this paper is in situations where actions do
not correspond with (previous) announcements. The following ﬁgure
therefore highlights those observations which we will subsume under the
terms “fear of ﬂoating” and “fear of pegging.”
9Figure 2: Fear of pegging (more ﬂoating than announced) and fear of
ﬂoating (more managing than announced)
Our dependent variable “FEAROFFLOAT” is a dummy variable
equal to 1 whenever the observation is in the lower right triangle of
the graph (i.e. when RR minus IMF is negative) ; otherwise it is 0.
Conversely, “FEAROFPEG” is 1 whenever we observe a country-year in
the top left corner of the graph (i.e. when RR minus IMF is positive);
otherwise it is 0.
3.2 Institutional data
We use a vast array of institutional quality data. A key challenge in
employing political data is that often, researchers have available obser-
vations only at one point in time; on the other hand, when data are
time-varying, they often cover only smaller set of countries. We also
face this trade-oﬀ in the present paper. We have chosen to use two sets
of institutional measures: proprietary data from BERI (which is avail-
able for about 50 countries from 1980 to the present) and data from
the Composite Indicator Dataset (Kaufmann et al. 2002), provided by
the World Bank. The latter dataset has very wide coverage (about 180
countries), but is available only for part of the 1990s.
10From the well-known BERI dataset, we employ three separate mea-
sures and a composite indicator. The Operations Risk Index (ORI) aims
to gauge the operations climate for foreign businesses. It measures a)
the degree to which nationals are given preferential treatment and b) the
general quality of the business climate, including bureaucratic and policy
continuity. The Political Risk Index (PRI) focuses on socio-political con-
ditions in a country; it considers internal causes of political risk (like the
fractionalization of the political spectrum), external causes of political
risk (like regional political forces) and symptoms of risk (like demonstra-
tions, strikes, and street violence). The purpose of the R-factor instead
is to estimate a country’s capacity and willingness for private foreign
companies to convert proﬁts and capital in the local currency to foreign
exchange and transfer the funds and have access to convertible currency
to import components, equipment, and raw materials. The BERI com-
posite index combines the three subindices.
Kaufmann, Kraay and Zoido-Lobaton (1999a, 1999b, 2002) provide
a set of governance indicators for a wide range of countries. Their data
is a statistical compilation of perceptions of the quality of governance of
a large number of survey respondents in industrial and developing coun-
tries, as well as non-governmental organizations, commercial risk rating
agencies, and think-tanks. The six indicators employed here include
Voice and Accountability, Political Stability, Government Eﬀectiveness,
Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law, and Control of Corruption. The terms
are self-explanatory, but in the appendix we provide some more detail on
the construction of these variables. These data are available for 2000/01
and 1997/1998. Because it is usually assumed that institutional quality
changes relatively slowly, we use the 1998 data for 1995 to 1998 and the
2001 data for 1999 and 2000 (the ﬁnal year of our sample)11.
3.3 Economic variables
As control variables, we use data readily available from the IMF and
other sources12. We use the lagged ratio of foreign liabilities to money
to control for the balance sheet eﬀect discussed above. Our controls
for openness include the lagged ratio of (exports+imports)/2 over GDP,
the lagged share of trade with the largest trading partner (measured
as exports to the largest trading partners as a share of total exports),
and the standard deviation of the logarithm of terms of trade over the
11As Kaufmann, Kraay and Zoido-Lobaton (2002) point out, for some indices,
governance quality does appear to shift relatively quickly. However, our qualitative
results are unchanged if we use the 1998 data only for 1998 and the 2001 data only
for 2000. However, the number of observations is obviously reduced.
12We thank Federico Sturzenegger for sharing his dataset of these data.
11previous ﬁve years adjusted by openness. We also use log GDP as well as
a dummy variable for the economic cycle (which is 1 if the GDP growth
rate in the preceding period is above long-run growth).
3.4 Some basic correlations
T a b l e4s h o w ss o m es i m p l ec o r r e l a t i o n sb e t w e e nm a n yo ft h ev a r i a b l e s
of interest. We only need to point out a few regularities. First, all the
political variables show a fairly high positive correlation between them
sleves. As is well known in the empirical literature on the eﬀects of in-
stitutional quality on the economy, many features of “good institutions”
go hand in hand in many countries. However, these correlations are not
perfect and in some cases are as low as 0.5, suggesting that using many
diﬀerent measures of institutional quality has some value added. Inter-
estingly the variable “democracy” (from the Polity IV dataset) displays
some relatively low correlations with variable capturing good economic
institutions. For instance, the correlation between democracy and pro-
tection of property rights, rule of law and political stability is below 0.5.
The correlation between democracy and control of corruption is barely
above 0.5. On the other hand, property rights and rule of law are highly
correlated with each other since they capture similar institutional fea-
tures even after the clustering procedure employed by Kaufmann, Kraay
and Zoido-Lobaton (1999).
Second, as is also well known, the level of development captured by
GDP per capita is positively correlated with quality of institutions. The
correlation of log of GDP per capita with institutional quality is in the
order of 0.5.
Third, the patterns of correlations of political variables with our ex-
change rate measure paint the following picture13. On the one hand, the
correlation between having a ﬁxed rate and quality of institutions is gen-
erally positive but small. That is, countries with “superior” institution
seem to slightly prefer ﬁxed rates. On the other hand, we observe a strik-
ing diﬀerence with respect to our deviation measures: fear of pegging is
negatively correlated with quality of institution and fear of ﬂoating is
positively correlated with quality of institutions. This switch in sign is
quite suggestive. As we will discuss below these patterns of correlations
survive deeper statistical analysis.
Finally, it is important to note the positive correlation between for-
eign denominated labilities and quality of institutions which suggest that
countries with superior institution are capable of borrowing more even
13Since the exchange rate measure is a categorical variable, calculating the simple
correlation is not statistically rigorous, but for the purposes of this ﬁrst look, we leave
aside this issue. In the next section, the correct statistical procedure is employed.
12though the correlations are not extremely high.
4 The choice of exchange rate regimes
Although our emphasis is on explaining deviations from oﬃcially an-
nounced behavior we begin with a brief analysis of the choice of actual
exchange rate arrangement, an analysis that sets the stage for what fol-
lows.
Table 5 displays some logit regressions where the dependent variable
captures whther the country in question, in a certain year adopts a ﬁxed
rate regime or not according to the Reinhart-Rogoﬀ classiﬁcation. So a
country is classiﬁed as 1 for having a ﬁx e de x c h a n g er a t er e g i m er e g a r d -
less of whether it says so and actually maintains its announcements or
says otherwise but in practice adopts a ﬁxed rate system14.
All the regressions in this table and in all those that follow include
year dummies. The ﬁrst two columns suggest that superior institu-
tions measured by the composite index of institutional quality described
above are associated with ﬁxed rates, but this correlation does not sur-
vive controlling for regional dummies or, more interestingly, controlling
for (lagged) foreign labilities. As Calvo and Reinhart (2002) note foreign
liabilities are a key determinant of way debtor countries my fear exchange
rate volatility and thus prefer pegs. Also, in Lahiri and Vegh (2001) pref-
erences for ﬁxed rates are explained with various cost associated with
the presence of foreign liabilities15. Note that openness is insigniﬁcant
after controlling for foreign liabilities suggesting that a ﬁnancial moti-
vation for avoiding volatility of foreign denominated labilities dominates
fear of exchange rate volatility on trade.
Table 6 reports only the coeﬃcient on many determinants of quality
of institutions obtained from the same regressions of Table 4 (the other
coeﬃcients of the regressions are not reported for brevity). The number
of observations is about 900 for the BERI variables and about 500-600
for the World Bank data. The message form this table is quite clear:
t h es a m ec o n c l u s i o n st h a tc a nb ed r a w nf r o mT a b l e5g e n e r a l i z et oo t h e r
measures of institutional quality - institutional quality does not have a
strong and consistent eﬀect. The coeﬃcients on the other controls (not
shown) of the regressions of Table 6 are very similar to those of Table
5.)
Thus, the bottom line is that ﬁxed rates are preferred by countries
14The qualitative results remain unchanged when we instead employ a categorical
variables regression, using ordered logit.
15Note that the presence of foreign labilities should explain a preference for ﬁxed
rates. It is much less clear why it should explain preferences for announcing ﬂoating
and then ﬁxing, that is, fear of ﬂoating.
13with a lot of foreign denominated labilities. Also countries with superior
institutions can borrow more, but holding institutions constant, the size
of foreign liabilities is a key determinant for a preference for ﬁxed rates16.
5F e a r o f ﬂoating and ”fear of pegging”
We now move to the main focus of our analysis, namely an empirical
analysis of why countries do not always do what they say they do.
Table 7 displays several logit regressions concerning the inability to
keep a peg. Recall that for brevity and with an analogy with the notion
of “fear of ﬂoating,” we label this behavior “fear of pegging,” a term that
is a bit misleading, since it reﬂects more than a “fear:” it also reﬂects
an ”inability”. Still, the analogy is too tempting and we use it.
As described in the data section, on the left hand side we have coun-
try years in which the country announces a regime that is more ﬁxed
than what is observed in practice. More precisely, we take the diﬀerence
between the RR de facto classiﬁcation and the IMF de iure classiﬁcation
and set the dependent variable equal to 1 whenever RR minus IMF is
greater than 0. In table 7 we present four “representative” regressions,
which all include year dummies, starting from a minimalist one and using
two measures of institutional quality, the composite index and a measure
of protection of property rights. The interesting ﬁnding is that in all
regressions measures of institutional quality are inversely related to fear
of pegging. That is, countries with superior institutions have less fear of
pegging, that is they are more capable of keeping actual pegging when
they announce it. Note that this result holds even after controlling for
the level of development (which enters with the expected sign: richer
countries keep promises more). We will show below that these results
generalize to other measures of institutional quality.
We interpret this eﬀect of institutions as reﬂecting a standard com-
mitment problem: better institutions lead to being more able to keep
macroeconomic policies consistent with nominal stability. More foreign
liabilities reduce the tendency to abandon pegging (or another type of
exchange rate management), a result that is again consistent with expec-
tations. Measures of trade and openness do not seem to show consistent
patterns. As we argued above these variables (foreign labilities and open-
ness) may themselves be endogenous to institutional quality, implying
that it is uncertain whether one wants to control for them. In fact, the
channel through which “poor” institutions lead to an inability to keep
a peg (“fear of pegging”) may have to do, at least in a large part, with
16T h ed a t aa l s os h o ws o m er e g i o n a lp a t t e r ni nt h ec h o i c eo fe x c h a n g er a t er e g i m e s
(not shown in the tables), a result that is consistent with ﬁndings of Levy-Yeyati et
al. (2002).
14poor macroeconomic policies, leading to macroeconomic instability.
In Table 8, we provide some rough correlations between our measures
of institutions and some key indicators of macroeconomic performance:
inﬂation, debt over GDP, investment over GDP. These variables are
especially closely linked to the ability of keeping a peg: inﬂation is ob-
viously linked to exchange rate stability, accumulated debt may trigger
runs against the currency, and investment over GDP captures whether
borrowing is used for investment (linked to growth) or consumption. All
the correlations (negative for the ﬁrst two variables, positive for the lat-
ter) show that better institutional quality is associated with superior
economic performance. The absolute magnitudes of these correlations
vary but they have always the expected sign and they are often as high
as 0.3/0.4 or more in absolute terms. The only political variable not
strongly associated with these economic performance indicators is the
variable “democracy,” a result that is consistent with the literature17.
Obviously, in our analysis we focus on institutional quality rather than
policy measures directly because the former are more exogenous. Ex-
change rate arrangements may have an eﬀect on certain policy outcomes
(inﬂation for instance) so one may run the risk of falling into reverse
causality problems. Also bad polici e sm a yb et h ei n t e r m e d i a t em o r e
proximate cause of departure from pegging, but bad institutions are the
ultimate cause of the policies.
Table 9 presents results for the fear of ﬂoating country-years. Here,
the dependent variable is equal to 1 if the diﬀerence between the RR
classiﬁcation and the IMF classiﬁcation is smaller than 0, to capture
countries that ﬂoat less than announced. The regressions are organized
i nt h es a m ew a ya si nT a b l e7 ,a n da l s oi n c l u d ey e a rd u m m i e s . T h e
results on the political variables are quite diﬀerent from those of Table
7. In the case of property rights the results are the exact opposite as of
Table 7. Now it looks like countries with superior institutions display
fear of ﬂoating. In the case of the composite index, once one controls for
foreign denominated liabilities the index of institutional quality looses
signiﬁcance, and once again more foreign liabilities lead to a preference
for ﬁx i n g .W i t he v e nm o r ec o n t r o lv a r i a b l e s ,t h ec o e ﬃcient changes its
sign, due the strong correlation with foreign liabilities and openness (this
is of course again just a reﬂection of the fact that the BERI indicators are
closer to policy variables than the other institutional quality indicators).
In table 10 we present a summary of results using all the other mea-
sures of institutional quality. All the regressions are the same as those
17See for instance Barro (1996). Note also that as pointed out before, the vari-
able democracy had a relatively low correlation with other indicators of quality of
institutions.
15presented in tables 7 and 9 but for compactness we show only the coef-
ﬁcients and their statistical signiﬁcance for the pollical variables. Even
a cursory look at these numbers reveals that the patterns of results of
Table 7 and 9 generalize to many other measures of institutional qual-
ity. On the right had side of the table where we show result for fear
of pegging most of the coeﬃcient are negative (34 out of 44) and most
of them statistically signiﬁcant at the 10 per cent level or better. The
results are especially strong for the composite indices of quality of in-
stitutions, for property rights protection and government eﬀectiveness.
O nt h ec o n t r a r yi nt h el e f t - h a n ds i d eo ft h et a b l ew eh a v et h ef e a ro f
ﬂoating results. Here most of the coeﬃcient are positive (39 out of 44)
and most of them statistically signiﬁcant. Results along these lines are
especially strong for regulatory quality, rule of law control of corruption,
government eﬀectiveness property rights. They are more inconclusive
for the composite indices.
In addition to the statistical signiﬁcance, we can also evaluate the
economic signiﬁcance of the ﬁndings. Since the model is a simple lim-
ited dependent variable model, we can directly gain insights regarding
t h ei m p o r t a n c eo ft h ee ﬀects from looking at the coeﬃcients together
with the descriptive statistics. For example, consider the role of prop-
erty rights. Consider ﬁrst the left half of Table 10, which gives the results
for fear of ﬂoating. Let us focus on regression D, for example. The co-
eﬃcient of 0.286 means that whenever the property rights variable goes
up by one point, all else being equal, the probability that a country falls
into the fear of ﬂoating category goes up by 28.6%, a quite signiﬁcant
eﬀect. Since the property rights variable ranges from -5 to -1, such a
one-point increase is not out of the question. Note that the eﬀect is
even bigger for fear of pegging. The same increase in property rights
quality would result in a decrease in the probability of fear of pegging
by more than 50%. Monte-Carlo simulations can be used to further eval-
uate these quantitative implications, but it is clear from this inspection
that the impact of institutional quality, where statistically signiﬁcant, is
typically also economically signiﬁcant. The diﬀerence in the patterns of
coeﬃcients between the two sides of the deviations form announcements
is strong. The result that countries with superior institutions display
fear of ﬂoating is less strong that the very strong result than countries
with poor institution display fear of pegging, but the diﬀerence in the
r e s u l t sc o n c e r n i n gt h et w os i d e so fd e v i a t i o n si ss t r i k i n g .
6 Alternative Classiﬁcations
We have rerun all our regressions of the previous section using the
classiﬁcation of exchange rate regimes proposed by Levy-Yeyati and
16Sturzenegger (2003) and by Shambuagh (2003). As we have argued
above in the data section, these classiﬁcations are less appropriate for
our purposes. The reason is that these two rely on oﬃcial exchange
rates rather than market determined rates. That is in the many country
years when there is both an oﬃcial market rate and a dual one, only RR
use the dual unoﬃcial market rate in their classiﬁcation. Since we are
interested in the deviation from announced oﬃcial policies and de facto
behavior of the exchange rate, the RR measure is the most appropriate
for our purposes.
Nevertheless, for the LYS classiﬁc a t i o n ,i tt u r n so u tt h a tb r o a d l y
speaking our results still go through (results are available on request).
That is, “fear of pegging” is associated with bad institutions and “fear of
ﬂoating” with good ones. If we use the Shambaugh (2003) classiﬁcation,
t h er e s u l t sa r em o r em u r k y . G i v e nt h ed i ﬀerent nature of the three
classiﬁcations is, in a sense, comforting that our results are the strongest
with the RR classiﬁcation.
7 Conclusions
We have investigated why countries do not follow through with their
plans regarding exchange rate arrangements. We found some interesting
answers. Countries that display fear of pegging, i.e., do not keep to
an announced peg tend to be those with poor institutions. The reason
is, we think, clear: poor economic institutions are associated with poor
economic management, and economic instability is incompatible with
monetary stability and exchange rate pegs. By contrast, we ﬁnd that
by and large countries with “good” institutions display fear of ﬂoating,
that is they ﬂoat less than announced, or to put it diﬀerently they try
to peg and limit exchange rate ﬂuctuations despite not having said so in
a d v a n c e . O u re x p l a n a t i o nf o rt h i sb e h a v i o ri st h a tt h e s ec o u n t r i e sa r e
afraid that wide exchange rate ﬂuctuations (especially devaluations) will
be taken by markets as an indication of poor economic management. In
other words, these countries peg more than announced to signal stability.
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198A p p e n d i x
8.1 Institutional data: a brief description
Kaufmann, Kraay and Zoido-Lobaton (1999a, 1999b, 2002) (KKZ) de-
ﬁne governance broadly as the traditions and institutions by which au-
thority in a country is exercised. They have compiled a large num-
ber of governance measures from a variety of sources into a governance
database. The sources include international organizations, political and
business rating agencies, think tanks, and non-governmental organiza-
tions18.
The two basic types of sources are polls and surveys. Polls are ex-
plicitly designed for cross-country comparability, but they are typically
based on the opinions of only a few experts per country. Surveys, on
the other hand, reﬂect the opinions of a larger number of respondents,
but questions can be interpreted in context- or culture speciﬁcw a y s( s e e
King 2003 for an approach to mitigating this problem). Also, surveys are
much more costly and therefore typically cover a smaller set of countries.
The main contribution of KKZ is to use unobserved variables techniques
to ﬂesh out six aggregate governance indicators from the large variety of
partly overlapping governance indicator databases. These six indicators
are the following:
“Voice and Accountability” is intended to capture the process by
which those in authority are selected and replaced. Indicators measuring
various aspects of the political process, civil liberties and political rights
are included to measure the extent to which citizens of a country are
able to participate in the selection of governments. KKZ also include in
this category three indicators measuring the independence of the media,
which serves an important role in monitoring those in authority and
holding them accountable for their actions.
“Political Instability and Violence” combines several indicators which
measure perceptions of the likelihood that the government in power will
be destabilized or overthrown by possibly unconstitutional and/or vio-
lent means. This index captures the idea that the quality of governance
in a country is compromised by the likelihood of wrenching changes in
government, which has a direct eﬀect on the continuity policies.
18In particular, the work draws on quantitative measures of governance from BERI,
the Wall Street Journal, Standard and Poor’s Country Risk Review, the EBRD’s
Transition Report, the Economists’ Country Risk Service and Country Forecast, the
Freedom House index, Gallup’s 50th Anniversary Survey, The Global Competitive-
ness Survey by the World Economic Forum, The Heritage Foundation Economic
Freedom Index, Asia Intelligence by the Political Economic Risk Consultancy, the
International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) by Political Risk Services, the World Com-
petitiveness Yearbook, and the World Bank’s World Development Report.
20In “Government Eﬀectiveness” KKZ combine perceptions of the qual-
ity of public service provision, the quality of the bureaucracy, the compe-
tence of civil servants, the independence of the civil service from political
pressures, and the credibility of the government’s commitment to poli-
cies.
“Regulatory burden” is more focused on the policies themselves. It
includes measures of the incidence of market-unfriendly policies such as
price controls or inadequate bank supervision, as well as perceptions of
the burdens imposed by excessive regulation in areas such as foreign
trade and business development.
The “Rule of Law” stands for several indicators which measure the
extent to which agents have conﬁdence in and abide by the rules of
society. These include perceptions of the incidence of both violent and
non-violent crime, the eﬀectiveness and predictability of the judiciary,
and the enforceability of contracts.
Finally, “Control of corruption” (or ”Graft”) measures perceptions
of how successful the country is in keeping the exercise of public power
for private gain at a minimum. The presence of corruption is often
a manifestation of a lack of respect of both the corrupter (typically a
private citizen) and the corrupted (typically a public oﬃcial) for the
rules which govern their interactions, and hence represents a failure of
governance.
The unobserved components model expresses the observed data in
each cluster as a linear function of the unobserved common component of
governance, plus a disturbance term capturing perception errors and/or
sampling variation in each indicator. Formally, then, the estimate of
governance for each country is the mean of the distribution of unob-
served governance conditional on the observed data for that country.
The assumptions of the model KKZ apply ensure that the distribution
of governance in each country is normal, conditional on the data for that
country. Even though in the present paper we employ the point estimates
of the governance indicators (as is the usual procedure in work on the
impact of institutional quality), it is noteworthy that KKZ ﬁnd that the
underlying governance concepts in each cluster are themselves not very
precisely estimated. Still, although imprecise, each aggregate indicator
provides a more precise signal of its corresponding broader governance
concept than do any of its component indicators. For more details on
the method, we refer the reader to the original papers.
218.2 Tables
Table 1: Descriptive statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
IMF (4=ﬂoat, 1=peg) 3132 2.09 1.22 1.00 4.00
RR 3203 2.48 1.26 1.00 4.00
LYS 3335 2.26 1.10 1.00 4.00
Sham 4183 2.75 1.32 1.00 4.00
RR minus IMF 3123 0.39 1.46 -3.00 3.00
FEARFLOAT (RR) 3123 0.23 0.42 0.00 1.00
FEARPEG (RR) 3123 0.36 0.48 0.00 1.00
LYS minus IMF 2463 0.32 1.05 -3.00 3.00
FEARFLOAT (LYS) 2463 0.16 0.37 0.00 1.00
FEARPEG (LYS) 2463 0.39 0.49 0.00 1.00
Sham minus IMF 2914 0.95 1.18 -3.00 3.00
FEARFLOAT (Sham) 2914 0.05 0.21 0.00 1.00
FEARPEG (Sham) 2914 0.59 0.49 0.00 1.00
Log GDP 4127 9.13 2.45 3.56 16.01
Lagged foreign liabilities / money 3644 2.33 15.05 -0.05 237.83
Openness 3202 0.37 0.22 0.00 1.52
Share of trade with largest partner 3834 0.28 0.16 0.00 1.00
Stdev. Terms of trade 2771 0.05 0.05 0.00 0.56
Economic cycle dummy 4237 0.50 0.50 0.00 1.00
Debt / GDP 1618 48.41 46.61 0.00 534.68
Inﬂation 3306 0.17 0.39 -3.87 5.48
Inv. / GDP 3175 0.22 0.08 0.02 0.66
BERI Composite 1071 52.14 13.02 23.87 189.03
BERI PRI 1071 50.22 12.67 11.00 78.00
BERI ORI 1071 53.30 13.39 19.80 85.00
BERI R 1071 52.94 19.02 26.00 480.00
Democracy 3195 1.13 7.59 -10.00 10.00
Property rights 714 -2.70 1.10 -5.00 -1.00
Voice and accountability 804 0.14 0.92 -1.93 1.73
Political stability 770 0.03 0.90 -2.59 1.69
Government eﬀectiveness 774 0.04 0.91 -1.77 2.16
Regulatory quality 798 0.09 0.80 -2.78 1.82
Rule of law 798 0.04 0.93 -2.15 2.00
Control of corruption 768 0.04 0.95 -1.57 2.25
22Table 4: Partial correlations
123456789 1 0 1 1 1 2 1 3 1 4 1 5 1 6 1 7 1 8
1 RRFIX 1.00
2 WIDEFEARPEG -0.52 1.00
3 WIDEFEARFLOAT -0.04 -0.41 1.00
4 LGDP -0.26 -0.06 0.26 1.00
5 FOREIGN LIABILITIES 0.08 0.00 0.03 -0.02 1.00
6 OPENNESS 0.21 -0.01 0.01 -0.34 0.26 1.00
7 BERI COMPOSITE 0.15 -0.25 0.07 0.51 0.44 0.28 1.00
8 ORI 0.16 -0.27 0.09 0.54 0.46 0.27 0.90 1.00
9 PRI 0.09 -0.20 0.04 0.46 0.41 0.24 0.85 0.83 1.00
10 R 0.16 -0.23 0.07 0.36 0.37 0.27 0.85 0.60 0.50 1.00
11 DEMOCRACY -0.24 -0.10 0.22 0.44 0.08 0.06 0.38 0.41 0.39 0.27 1.00
12 PROPERTY RIGHTS 0.10 -0.17 0.13 0.56 0.16 0.16 0.70 0.77 0.68 0.56 0.47 1.00
13 VOICEAND 0.05 -0.15 0.12 0.47 0.14 0.14 0.62 0.67 0.61 0.48 0.83 0.68 1.00
14 POLITICAL STABILITY 0.07 -0.02 0.09 0.48 0.17 0.21 0.79 0.77 0.83 0.64 0.47 0.65 0.75 1.00
15 GOV. EFFECTIVE 0.09 -0.14 0.14 0.57 0.19 0.15 0.85 0.89 0.84 0.69 0.52 0.79 0.79 0.81 1.00
16 REGULATORY QUAL 0.09 -0.24 0.21 0.50 0.14 0.17 0.68 0.74 0.68 0.52 0.62 0.75 0.75 0.68 0.78 1.00
17 RULE OF LAW 0.07 -0.12 0.14 0.58 0.18 0.18 0.86 0.90 0.85 0.71 0.49 0.81 0.78 0.87 0.92 0.77 1.00
18 CONTROL CORRUPTION 0.10 -0.13 0.11 0.52 0.18 0.16 0.82 0.86 0.81 0.65 0.53 0.76 0.79 0.78 0.93 0.72 0.91 1.00Table 5: Dependent variable Rrfix = 1 if fixed according to RR, 0 otherwise.
1234
Composite 0.031 0.031 -0.002 0.009
(5.20)*** (4.18)*** -0.21 -0.77
lgdp -0.009 0.084 -0.034
-0.13 -1.18 -0.33




Constant -3.352 -3.714 -2.655 -1.817
(6.21)*** (4.77)*** (3.26)*** -1.54
Observations 1014 1013 950 897
Robust z statistics in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%Table 6: Dependent variable Rrfix = 1 if fixed according to RR, 0 otherwise.
For a description of the specifications 1-5, see text.
1234
Composite 0.031 0.031 -0.002 0.009
(5.20)*** (4.18)*** -0.21 -0.77
ORI 0.034 0.037 0.003 0.018
(6.32)*** (5.23)*** -0.36 (1.74)*
PRI 0.018 0.014 -0.016 -0.012
(3.09)*** (2.00)** (1.91)* -1.16
R 0.027 0.028 0.005 0.012
(4.89)*** (4.00)*** -0.64 -1.38
Democracy -0.074 -0.051 -0.06 -0.075
(13.37)***(8.15)*** (9.01)***(10.36)***
Property 0.201 0.4 0.112 0.422
(2.66)*** (3.90)*** -0.96 (3.10)***
Voice and Accountability 0.122 0.236 -0.122 -0.04
-1.51 (2.35)** -1.03 -0.29
Political Stability 0.171 0.282 -0.1 0.002
(1.99)** (3.06)*** -0.96 -0.02
Government Effectiveness 0.208 0.404 -0.052 0.221
(2.50)** (3.97)*** -0.42 -1.52
Regulatory Quality 0.245 0.46 0.032 0.228
(2.49)** (3.92)*** -0.24 -1.36
Rule of Law 0.148 0.349 -0.092 0.078
(1.84)* (3.62)*** -0.8 -0.57
Control of Corruption 0.222 0.368 -0.038 0.068
(2.84)*** (3.89)*** -0.31 -0.49
Robust z statistics in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%Table 7: Dependent variable: FEAROFPEG
ABCDABCD
Composite -0.053 -0.031 -0.031 -0.027
(7.73)*** (3.97)*** (3.13)*** (1.89)*
Property -0.451 -0.509 -0.319 -0.519
(4.62)*** (3.97)*** (2.15)** (2.39)**
lgdp -0.352 -0.338 -0.662 0.098 0.124 0.319
(4.34)*** (4.03)*** (4.79)*** (1.68)* (2.03)** (3.35)***
Lagged foreign liabilities -0.102 -0.59 -0.697 -2.409
-0.85 (2.31)** (1.69)* (3.74)***
Lagged openness 0.564 2.308
-0.4 -1.62
1974 trade with largest partner -0.579 -2.414
-0.98 (2.84)***




Constant 2.703 5.678 5.332 7.464 -2.359 -3.636 -3.938 -5.895
(5.62)*** (6.22)*** (5.53)*** (4.63)*** (6.07)*** (4.04)*** (4.09)*** (3.30)***
Observations 980 979 918 753 699 688 651 430
Robust z statistics in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%Table 8: Correlations of institutional quality with macroeconomic indicators
1 2 3456789 1 0 1 1 1 2 1 3 1 4 1 5
1 DEBTGDP1 1.00
2 INF 0.25 1.00
3 INVGDP -0.11 -0.14 1.00
4 COMPOSIT -0.09 -0.37 0.16 1.00
5 PRI -0.23 -0.28 0.14 0.85 1.00
6 ORI -0.03 -0.38 0.12 0.90 0.83 1.00
7 R 0.01 -0.37 0.19 0.85 0.50 0.60 1.00
8 DEMOCRACY -0.10 0.00 0.00 0.38 0.39 0.41 0.27 1.00
9 PROPERTY -0.32 -0.28 0.05 0.70 0.68 0.77 0.56 0.47 1.00
10 VOICEAND -0.40 -0.26 0.04 0.62 0.61 0.67 0.48 0.83 0.68 1.00
11 STABILITY -0.44 -0.31 0.06 0.79 0.83 0.77 0.64 0.47 0.65 0.75 1.00
12 GOV EFF -0.27 -0.36 0.09 0.85 0.84 0.89 0.69 0.52 0.79 0.79 0.81 1.00
13 REG QUAL -0.39 -0.35 0.10 0.68 0.68 0.74 0.52 0.62 0.75 0.75 0.68 0.78 1.00
14 RULE OF LAW -0.37 -0.35 0.11 0.86 0.85 0.90 0.71 0.49 0.81 0.78 0.87 0.92 0.77 1.00
15 CONT CORR -0.24 -0.32 0.07 0.82 0.81 0.86 0.65 0.53 0.76 0.79 0.78 0.93 0.72 0.91 1.00Table 9: Dependent variable: FEAROFFLOAT
ABCDABCD
Composite 0.013 0.011 0.004 -0.018
(2.43)** -1.54 -0.53 (1.73)*
Property 0.234 0.21 0.185 0.286
(3.42)*** (2.40)** (2.01)** (2.08)**
lgdp 0.033 0.048 0.268 -0.015 0.021 0.002
-0.54 -0.76 (3.04)*** -0.34 -0.47 -0.04
Lagged foreign liabilities 0.236 0.432 0.018 0.023
(3.00)*** (2.77)*** (2.35)** (1.87)*
Lagged openness 1.448 -1.495
-1.29 (2.21)**
1974 trade with largest partner 1.642 2.43
(3.21)*** (3.65)***




Constant -1.76 -2.03 -1.963 -3.136 0.435 0.504 0.033 -0.06
(3.84)*** (3.05)*** (2.87)*** (3.13)*** -1.52 -0.79 -0.05 -0.06
Observations 980 979 918 753 699 688 651 430
Robust z statistics in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%Table 10: Broken promises - both ways
ABCD ABCD
Composite 0.013 0.011 0.004 -0.018 -0.053 -0.031 -0.031 -0.027
(2.43)** -1.54 -0.53 (1.73)* (7.73)*** (3.97)*** (3.13)*** (1.89)*
PRI 0.006 0.001 -0.005 -0.013 -0.035 -0.012 -0.01 0.001
-1.13 -0.14 -0.66 -1.54 (6.01)*** (1.88)* -1.37 -0.06
ORI 0.015 0.015 0.008 -0.017 -0.055 -0.038 -0.039 -0.038
(3.06)*** (2.39)** -1.12 (1.77)* (8.73)*** (5.21)*** (4.29)*** (2.99)***
R 0.012 0.01 0.006 -0.01 -0.044 -0.024 -0.022 -0.025
(2.46)** -1.6 -0.91 -1.24 (7.02)*** (3.52)*** (2.68)*** (2.05)**
property 0.234 0.21 0.185 0.286 -0.451 -0.509 -0.319 -0.519
(3.42)*** (2.40)** (2.01)** (2.08)** (4.62)*** (3.97)*** (2.15)** (2.39)**
Voice and Accountability 0.28 0.154 0.139 0.342 -0.422 -0.308 0.044 -0.039
(3.59)*** (1.65)* -1.41 (2.44)** (3.94)*** (2.35)** -0.3 -0.22
Political Stability 0.214 0.127 0.122 0.282 -0.054 0.117 0.496 0.58
(2.54)** -1.29 -1.16 (1.85)* -0.57 -0.95 (3.42)*** (3.03)***
Government Effectivene 0.312 0.254 0.24 0.407 -0.428 -0.388 0.065 -0.022
(3.87)*** (2.46)** (2.14)** (2.71)*** (3.79)*** (2.51)** -0.35 -0.09
Regulatory Quality 0.581 0.537 0.478 0.862 -0.74 -0.774 -0.535 -0.522
(6.24)*** (4.62)*** (3.74)*** (3.66)*** (6.37)*** (5.03)*** (2.89)*** (2.02)**
Rule of Law 0.316 0.245 0.237 0.363 -0.335 -0.283 0.113 0.44
(4.11)*** (2.43)** (2.21)** (2.39)** (3.46)*** (2.13)** -0.71 (1.98)**
control of corruption 0.235 0.178 0.195 0.434 -0.384 -0.34 0.112 0.154
(3.04)*** (1.91)* (1.94)* (3.25)*** (3.60)*** (2.51)** -0.64 -0.65
Robust z statistics in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Note: For a description of the specifications A-D, see text.
Dependent variable: FearOfFloat Dependent variable: FearOfPeg